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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
vs. : 
Case No. 860475 
ALLEN BOYD MILLER, : 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a final order and judgment of 
conviction for the offense of production of a controlled sub-
stance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Annotated, §58-37-8(1)(a )(i) (Supp. 1985), in the Third Judicial 
District Court, Salt Lake County, the Honorable Judith Billings 
presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COTJH|T 
Appellant was charged by Information with the offense 
of Production of a Controlled Substance, a Third Degree Felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Annotated, §58-37-8(1)(a)(i) (Supp. 
1985). On February 6, 1986, a suppression hearing was held before 
the district court, at which time appellant made a motion to 
suppress certain evidence obtained pursuant to a search of his 
residence. The district court denied the motion and the case 
was tried before the court without a jury on June 19, 1986. 
The case went to trial upon stipulated facts (State's Exhibit 
8), with the only issue to be decided by the court involving 
the identification of the plant material seized. The district 
court, in a memorandum decision dated July 1, 1986, found that 
the State had shown that the plant material was marijuana and 
judgment of conviction against appellant was entered on August 
28, 1986. On September 12, 1986, appellant filed a notice of 
appeal with this court, 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks an order from this court reversing 
the trial court's order denying appellant's motion to suppress, 
reversing the judgment and conviction rendered against him, 
and remanding this case to the third district court for a new 
trial, or in the alternative, an order to the district court 
that the case be dismissed. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the affidavit filed in support of the search 
warrant fail to establish probable cause, thereby requiring the 
suppression of all evidence seized pursuant thereto? 
2. Did the supporting affidavit contain false or 
misleading statements, which, when removed from the affidavit, 
leave insufficient evidence upon which to establish probable 
cause? 
3. Is the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary 
rule, as set forth in United States v. Leon and Utah Code Anno-
tated §77-35-12(g), inapplicable and/or inappropriate in the 
present situation? 
4. Did the facts set forth in the supporting affidavit 
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justify or require a "no knock" search warrant? 
5. Did the State, through its expert witnesses, prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the substance seized was actually 
marijuana? 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Appellant, on or about August 1, 1985, resided at 
7889 South 3850 West, West Jordan, Utah. On that date a search 
warrant (a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 2) was 
issued authorizing the police to search appellant's residence 
and all structures and vehicles located on the property. The 
warrant was based upon an affidavit (a copy of which is attached 
hereto as Exhibit 1) filed by Detective Stewart Smith. In the 
affidavit, Officer Smith testified that the following facts 
were true and correct: 
(a) Certain of Miller's neighbors complained about 
"unusual traffic" in the neighborhood; 
(b) Officer Smith observed and photographed three 
storage sheds, two swamp coolers which blew cool air 
into boarded up windows, a furnace and accompanying 
vent stacks, and a series of lights placed upon a 
swamp cooler; 
(c) Certain unidentified neighbors have observed 
Miller mixing up peat moss on his premises; 
(d) Some cars were seen leaving Miller's house after 
a short stay early in the morning; 
(e) One of the cars seen in the morning hours belonged 
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to Ma known drug user"; 
(f) On an undisclosed number of occasions, a U-Haul 
truck has been parked by Miller's house which un-
identified neighbors have heard being loaded and 
unloaded at night; 
(g) Unidentified neighbors have not seen Miller's 
garage door open; 
(h) Unidentified neighbors have seen two large dogs 
with Miller; 
(i) Miller's power bills are higher than normal and 
he pays the bills without protest; 
(j) Miller "has prior illegal possession charges for 
possession of psilicybin mushrooms, 1/4 pound and 
possession of marijuana"; 
(k) Franklin Spain, who has been arrested for posses-
sion of marijuana in the last year, resides at Miller's 
house; 
(1) Credit reports given to the power company show 
Miller to be self employed and doing business as 
Miller's Auto Body Shops, which did not seem to 
exist. 
(Exhibit 1). 
After listing these facts, Officer Smith concluded that 
each item observed around appellant's home could possibly be 
used to cultivate marijuana or other possible illegal substances. 
(Exhibit 1) After approximately six weeks of surveillance, 
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Officer Smith confirmed the unidentified neighbors' reports of 
the presence of the above listed property items. (Exhibit 1). 
Officer Smith further testified that these facts justified a 
"no knock" warrant. Based upon the foregoing, the magistrate 
found that there was probable cause to believe that there were 
marijuana plants and illegal mushrooms on the appellant's 
premises. 
Upon executing the warrant, police seized several 
items which they claimed were marijuana plants and personal 
property allegedly used in the production of controlled sub-
stances. Appellant made a motion to suppress the evidence 
seized and a suppression hearing was held in the district court 
on February 6, 1986. At the hearing, appellant called Officer 
Smith and questioned him as to the veracity of the factual 
statements contained in the affidavit. As to the alleged 
cohabitation of appellant and Franklin Spain, Officer Smith 
testified that he never observed Mr. Spain at appellant's 
residence during the six weeks surveillance period. Officer 
Smith based his conclusory statement upon an address given by 
Mr. Spain when he was arrested over a year before the affidavit 
was prepared. (Tr. 9, 10)1 AS to his statement in the 
affidavit that one of the cars visiting appellant's residence 
was registered to a "known drug user", Officer Smith testified 
that he was referring to a Vann Larson. (Tr. 10) Officer 
1. "Tr." refers to the transcript of the suppression hearing 
held on February 6, 1985. 
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Smith concluded that Vann Larson was a "known drug user" because 
he had previously been arrested for possession of narcotics 
paraphernalia. (Tr. 10f 11) However, Officer Smith admitted 
that he knew that those same charges against Mr. Larson had 
been dismissed. (Tr. 11) Officer Smith admitted that he had 
never seen Vann Larson use drugs. (Tr. 11) With regard to the 
U-Haul truck parked by appellant's house, Officer Smith testified 
that he never saw the truck filled with marijuana or any other 
illegal substance. (Tr. 11) Mr. Smith only saw soil additives 
and conditioners stacked around the truck. (Tr. 12) 
After hearing Officer Smith's testimony, the court 
denied appellant's motion to suppress and the evidence seized 
was introduced at his trial. 
Appellant was tried before the court without a jury 
on June 19, 1986. A written stipulation was presented to and 
received by the court which, in substance, provided that the only 
issue to be resolved by the court was whether the state had shown, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the substance confiscated was in 
fact "marijuana". At trial, appellant renewed his motion to 
suppress pursuant to State v. Lesley, 672 P.2d 79 (1983), which 
was denied. (R. 252) 
At trial, the State presented three witnesses, Officer 
Smith, the affiant, Kevin Smith and Robert Brinkman, both 
criminalists for the State of Utah. 
Officer Smith testified that he has attended certain 
instructional courses and worked in narcotics for the past two 
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years. (R. 216) Officer Smith concluded that the plants which 
were seized at appellant's address were marijuana because, when 
he executed the warrant, he could smell what he believed to be 
marijuana (R. 219), and the plant material had "leafy" green 
leaves, with an odd number of petals on the serrated leaves. 
(R. 221) On cross examination, Officer Smith admitted that the 
drug related courses which he has attended dealt with drug 
investigation, not substance identification. (R. 223) 
Kevin Smith, a criminalist, after relating his quali-
fications and experience, testified that he examined the seized 
substance microscopically (R. 229) and subjected it to a 
Duquenois-Levine test. Based upon these two! tests, Mr. Smith 
concluded that the substance was marijuan^. (R. 230) On 
cross examination, Mr. Smith admitted that he has never taken 
any courses in botany. (R. 235) Mr. Smith testified that there 
were certain types of hairs present on the plants which led him 
to conclude that they were marijuana. (R. 234) However, these 
same hairs can be found on over a hundred different plants. 
(R. 235, 261) As to the Duquenois-Levine test, which is a 
chemical analysis, Mr. Smith testified that other substances or 
chemicals could possibly react similarly to marijuana. (R. 
239) However, Mr. Smith only visually checked the plants to 
see whether any such reactants were located on the plants. 
(R. 239) 
In his defense, appellant called Dr. Dwight Fullerton, 
who is a professor at Oregon State University College of Pharmacy 
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and who specializes in plant identification. (R. 254f 255) 
Dr. Fullerton testified that marijuana does not have a unique 
physical appearance and that many plants have serrated edges 
and an odd number of petals on the leaves. (R. 257, 258) As 
to the two types of hairs relied upon by Kevin Smith in his 
visual examination, Dr. Fullerton testified that hundreds of 
plants possessed some combination of those hairs. (R. 261, 
262) With regard to the Duquenois-Levine test, Dr. Fullerton 
stated that many plants could yield a result similar to that of 
marijuana. (R. 265) Dr. Fullerton opined that if he were 
presented with the evidence produced by the State, i.e., that the 
plant looked like marijuana, that microscopically it had two 
certain types of hairs which are present on marijuana as well as 
many other plants, and that the plant tested positive under the 
Duquenois-Levine test, he would not be able to state with a 
reasonable degree of scientific certainty that the substance was 
marijuana. (R. 268, 269) 
After hearing the testimony of Robert Brinkman, a state 
criminalist, as to the industry standards adoped by the State, 
the court found that the substance in question was marijuana and 
convicted him as charged. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The arguments in the brief will proceed as follows: 
First: Under both state and federal law, the facts 
and circumstances set forth in the supporting affidavit fail to 
establish the probable cause necessary to justify the issuance 
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of the search warrant. The affidavit simply contains innocuous 
facts, which are as consistent with innocent activity as with 
criminal conduct, and unsupported conclusions which do not 
support a finding of probable cause. 
Second: The supporting affidavit contains false 
statements which were made knowingly or with reckless disregard 
for the truth. When these false statements are removed from 
the affidavit, the remaining material does not establish probable 
cause. Should the court find that the affidavit is otherwise 
sufficient under federal law, then the court should take this 
opportunity to interpret the state constitution so as to prohibit 
the type of police misconduct present in this case. 
Third: When the court finds that probable cause was 
not established, the evidence seized is not otherwise admissible 
under the Utah Code or under the Leon "good faith" exception to 
the exclusionary rule. The affiant's intentional misstatements 
and material ommissions render any "good faith" exception 
inapplicable and inappropriate. 
Fourth: The Utah Fourth Amendment Enforcement Act is 
unconstitutional under both the federal and state constitutions 
because it places a greater burden upon a defendant than that 
required by the United States Supreme Court in Leon. 
Fifth: The facts and circumstances of this case do 
not justify the issuance of a "no-knock" warrant and the 
execution of such a warrant in this case violates the Fourth 
Amendment. 
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Sixth: At trial, the state failed to prove, beyond a 
reasonable doubtf that the material seized from appellant's 
residence was in fact marijuana. The two tests employed by the 
state criminalist were not unique to marijuana and hundreds of 
plants yield results similar to that of marijuana. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SET FORTH IN 
THE AFFIDAVIT FAIL TO ESTABLISH THE PROBABLE 
CAUSE NECESSARY TO JUSTIFY THE ISSUANCE OF 
THE SEARCH WARRANT UNDER BOTH STATE AND 
FEDERAL LAW. 
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States reads as follows: 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, and papers and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrant shall issue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the person or things to be 
seized. 
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution also requires 
that warrants shall issue only upon a showing of probable 
cause. In connection with the issuance of a search warrant, 
there must be probable cause to believe that an item is located 
in a certain place at a particular time. See, United States v. 
Freeman, 685 F.2d 942, 948 (5th Cir. 1982). Whether probable 
cause exists in any given situation is a question of fact to be 
determined by applying an objective test. The United States 
Supreme Court, in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949), 
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articulated this test as follows: 
Probable cause exists where facts arid 
circumstances within theirf the arresting 
officers1f knowledge and of which they had 
reasonably trustworthy information, are 
sufficient in themselves to warrant a man 
of reasonable caution in the belief that an 
offense has been or is being committed by 
the person to be arrested, IQ. at 175. 
One factor to be considered in making this probable 
cause determination is whether or not the police have actual 
knowledge that a crime has in fact been committed. Whenf as in 
the present situation, the police possess no knowledge as to 
the actual commission of a crime, a greater quantum of proof is 
required to establish probable cause. For example, in State v. 
Frazier, 421 A.2d 546 (1980), the court stated: 
One of the most important elements in 
determining whether probable cause existed 
is satisfied when police know a crime has 
actually been committed. In many cases the 
police do not know that a crime has been 
committed. When the arrest or search is 
made when the police do not know that a 
crime has been committed, more and better 
evidence is needed to prove that probable 
cause exists for the [search] than is the 
case when police do know that a crime has 
been committed. Id_. at 550. (jemphasis 
added) 
Another factor to be considered is the source of the 
information set forth in the supporting affidavit. In the 
present case, the affiant received certain information from 
unidentified citizens supposedly living near appellant. In 
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), the Supreme Court 
rejected Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) and Spinelli 
v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), which in combination 
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held thatf when an affiant officer receives information from an 
informant, the affidavit must contain facts sufficient to 
establish the basis of the informant's knowledge and the infor-
mant's veracity or reliability. See also, Massachusetts v. 
Upton, 466 U.S. 727 (1984). Instead, the Supreme Court in 
Gates adopted a "totality of the circumstances" test to be used 
in deciding whether an informant's tip provided probable cause 
upon which to base a search warrant. The Gates court defined 
this test as follows: 
Whether given all the circumstances set 
forth in the affidavit before [the magis-
trate] , including the 'veracity' and 'basis 
of knowledge1 of persons supplying informa-
tion, there is a fair probability that 
contraband or evidence of a crime will be 
found in a particular place. And the duty 
of a reviewing court is simply to ensure 
that the magistrate has a substantial basis 
for . . . concluding that probable cause 
existed. I6_. at 219. (emphasis added) 
The Utah Supreme Court, in State v. Anderson, 701 
P.2d 1099 (Utah 1985), abandoned the Aguilar - Spinelli test 
and followed Gates. See also, State v. Espinoza, 39 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 23 (Utah 1986). In adopting Gates, the Utah Supreme Court 
stated: 
Nevertheless, in State v. Bailey, [675 P.2d 
1203 (1984)], we observed that even under 
the Gates "totality of the circumstances" 
standard, compliance with the Aguilar-
Spinelli guidelines might be necessary to 
establish the requisite "fair probability" 
that the evidence sought actually exists 
and can be found where the informant so 
states. RK at 1101. 
In his concurring opinion in Anderson, Justice Stewart stated: 
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The basis of the affiant's knowledge must 
be set forth in the affidavit together with 
some evidence supporting the veracity of 
the informant when the affidavit includes 
allegations of a confidential informant. 
Without such a foundation, a warrant becomes 
a mere charade, and the basic liberty 
protected by the Fourth Amendment would 
constitute an unenforceable right, or, more 
realistically stated, no right at all. Id. 
at 1104. (emphasis added) 
At this point, it is important to note exactly what 
facts comprise the "totality of the circumstances" upon which 
the warrant was based in the present situation. The affidavit 
submitted by Officer Smith cites various pieces of information 
obtained from confidential, unidentified informants, who are 
alleged to be private citizens and neighbors of appellant. 
However, none of the information provided pointed to any type of 
criminal activity or behavior. For example, "neighbors" provided 
the police with the following information: 
(a) There is unusual traffic in the 
neighborhood of "the suspect premises"; 
(b) Occupants of the residence were observ-
ed mixing peat moss, with two large dogs 
with them; 
(c) A U-Haul trailer parked near the house 
was heard being loaded and unloaded late at 
night; 
(d) "Neighbors" have never seen the garage 
door open; and 
(e) Allen Miller acts secretive when 
observed around the premises. 
The affidavit does not provide the names of the "neighbors", 
who allegedly observed these innocent events, nor does it 
contain an approximate date on which any of the observations 
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were made or related to the affiant. In fact, there are no 
dates given as to any of the information provided. There are 
no facts alleged to show how the neighbors knew it was Mr. 
Miller who was the person acting "secretive". There is no 
information as to how many times the U-Haul truck was observed, 
or how many "neighbors" supposedly heard the loading and unload-
ing take place. 
Notwithstanding this lack of detail, even more 
important is the fact that the "neighbors" are not identified 
in the affidavit nor is the reliability or veracity of the 
informants addressed. In a similar situation, the court in 
People v. Fatman, 406 N.Ed.2d 619 (1980) noted: 
"The State cannot merely by stating that 
their informant is a citizen informant, 
establish that fact. Supporting facts must 
be presented which support the conclusion 
that the informant is a private citizen." 
Id. at 623. 
In the affidavit, Officer Smith states that he considers the 
information received from the "confidential informants" reliable 
because: 
"Neighbors are private citizens whose 
reports have been observed and verified by 
affiant and photographed. Your affiant has 
verified the above information to be current 
and accurate through the following indepen-
dent investigation: Continuous surveillance 
from June 14, 1985, to August 1, 1985, in 
which traffic survey and photographic 
surveillance, and background investigation 
confirmed the neighbors reports." ( Exhibit 
• " 1 . ) 
Affiant's claim that the neighbors' reports have been verified 
is supposedly supported by the following statements in the 
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affidavit: 
(1) A traffic survey of the area identified 
several cars. The several cars came and 
went from the premises in the early morning 
hours. They would remain only a short 
time. 
(2) A U-Haul truck has been located at the 
rear of the garage on numerous occasions. 
(3) A furnace like apparatus was in the 
garage area and the windows were boarded 
up. 
(4) A "traffic survey" of "the area" ob-
served several automobilesf for which owner-
ship records identified a known drug user 
coming and going from the premises in the 
early morining hours. Those vehicles 
remained for a short period of time. 
The following factual allegations set forth in the 
affidavit were allegedly ascertained as a result of the police 
investigation which began on June 14f 1985: 
A. Information from Utah Power and Light 
showed that the electrical service lines 
coming into the residence were three times 
the size normally required for a residence 
of a similar size. 
B. Monthly power consumptionf according to 
Utah Power and Light, was four to five 
times the normal amount of usage. 
C. According to Utah Power and Light, the 
monthly bill was paid without objection. 
The account was in the name Allen B. Miller. 
D. The "suspect", Allen B. Miller, has 
prior illegal possession charges for 1/4 
pound of psilacybin mushrooms, and posses-
sion of marijuana. 
E. Franklin David Spain, of the same 
address, had been arrested for possession 
of marijuana in the last year. 
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F. Credit reports show suspect Miller self-
employed with Miller's Auto Body Shop which 
does not "seem to exist". Suspect truck 
observed at residence never has tools in 
it. 
(Exhibit 1) Following the narration set forth abovef the af-
fiant added this conclusory statement: 
Affiant, a trained narcotics officer knows 
that peat moss is used for growing marijuana 
and mushrooms and has observed numerous 
stacks of plastic buckets at the residence, 
knows that furnaces can be used to dry 
plants for usage, and that swamp coolers 
can vent and humidify plants being grown in 
a basement as at suspects premises. Large 
electrical consumption would be used to 
facilitate grow lights and drying equipment; 
and the truck used to load shipments for 
periodic distribution or final cultivation 
of plants at another growing site. 
(Exhibit 1) 
The factual deficiencies are clearly evident from the 
face of the affidavit. There are no facts alleged to show that 
the Allen B. Miller, who had an account with Utah Power & Light 
Co., is the same person who is alleged to have had prior drug 
possession charges. There is no evidence to establish the 
basis for the affiant's conclusion that Franklin Spain lived at 
the residence with Miller. There is no identification of the 
credit report referred to and relied upon for the information in 
paragraph (F) above. Although the affiant stated that peat 
moss was used for growing marijuana and mushrooms, there is no 
allegation that the police saw any peat moss during their 
investigation. There is no allegation that the police ever 
observed the "furnace-like apparatus" in operation. Finally, 
there is no relevance noted as to the observation of "stacks of 
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white buckets" at the residence, or as to who was the owner of 
the "suspect truck" or the tools in it. 
Although the affidavit contains substantial informa-
tion, the most important aspect thereof is what the affidavit 
does not contain. There is no indication that anyone had seen 
any controlled substance on the premises. There is no informa-
tion that any controlled substance had been purchased at the 
residence. There is no allegation that the U-Haul truck ever 
contained marijuana or that the police attempted to follow the 
truck to see where it went and whether or not it was ever 
loaded or unloaded. The police had no information that a crime 
was being committed. The officer's conclusibnary paragraph as 
to what all the items observed could be used for could apply 
just as easily to tomatoes, flowers, mushrooms or other legal 
indoor cultivation, as well as to the growing of marijuana and 
illegal mushrooms. 
Other courts have been presented wit^ h similar innocuous 
facts and have held that probable cause did not exist. For 
instance, in People v. Remers, 470 P.2d 11 (Cal. 1970) the 
California Supreme Court, in the course of defining probable 
cause, stated: 
"Where the events are as consistent with 
innocent activity as with criminal activity, 
a detention based on these events [is 
unlawful: [citation ommitted] a fortiori, 
an arrest and search based on events as 
consistent with innocent activity as with 
criminal activity is unlawful. _I<3. at 13. 
(emphasis added) 
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In State v. McPherson, 698 P.2d 563 (Wash. App. 1985), 
the court applied the principle that innocent activity would 
not support a finding of probable cause to a factual situation 
similar to the present. In that case the police received an 
anonymous tip that the defendant was growing and selling mari-
juana. The police observed black plastic covering the garage 
windows, condensation on the windows, and potting soil piled 
up. A power use printout from the electric company indicated a 
two to threefold increase in power consumption beginning when 
the defendant moved in. In finding that the search warrant was 
issued without probable cause, the court made the following 
relevant comments: 
. . . If the informant's information does 
not satisfy this test, [Aguilar-Spinelli, ] 
probable cause can still be established if 
independent police work sufficiently 
corroborates the informant. 
The anonymous tip was insufficient to 
establish probable cause because there was 
no showing that the caller was honest or 
his information reliable, or that he ob-
tained the information in a reliable manner. 
Moreover, the information contained in the 
affidavit for the search warrant did not 
point to criminal activity, suspicious 
activity or any activity at all. Everything 
that was observed by Detective Oswald was 
commonplace, consistent with normal be-
havior. 
The independent police investigations 
should point to suspicious activity, 
probative indications of criminal activity 
along the lines suggested by the informant. 
Merely verifying 'innocuous details', 
commonly known facts or easily predictable 
events should not suffice to remedy a 
deficiency in either the basis of knowledge 
or veracity prong. _Id. at 562. 
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In addressing the increased use of electricity, the 
court observed: 
. . • such a sharp increase in electrical 
use in an ordinary residence is somewhat 
unusual but there are too many other 
plausible explanations for the increased 
energy use for that information to point to 
criminal activity. Jx3. at 564. 
Similarly, State v. Higby, 613 P.2d 1192 (Wash App. 
1980) involved a search warrant issued for marijuana at a resi-
dence where two informants told police they had purchased 
marijuana two weeks earlier. The police subsequently, on 
"several occasions", observed a considerable amount of vehicular 
traffic and pedestrians visiting the Higby home for two or 
three minutes. The police observations were made "at all hours 
of the day". In the affidavit the officer stated that this 
behavior was inconsistent with what would be generally considered 
ordinary visits. The court, in finding there was no probable 
cause, made the following observations which are pertinent to 
the issues in this case: 
. . . It is not enough, however, to set 
forth that criminal activity occurred at 
some prior time. The facts or circumstances 
must support the reasonable probability 
that the criminal activity was occurring at 
or about the time the warrant was issued. 
R5. at 1194 
When the informant is an ordinary citizen, 
as opposed to the criminal or professional 
informant, and his identity is revealed to 
the issuing magistrate, intrinsic indicia 
of the informant's reliability may be found 
in his detailed description of the underly-
ing circumstances of the crime observed or 
about which he had knowledge. 
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The only other information discussed in 
the affidavit was the reference to 'con-
siderable1 traffic at the Higby residence. 
The affidavit did not indicate the number, 
time and date of the visits. Although 
search warrant affidavits are not read 
hypertechnically, they must disclose suffi-
cient facts to allow the magistrate to 
exercise independent judgment on the ques-
tion of probable cause. [citations omitted] 
The officer's statement that the visits 
were 'inconsistent with what would be 
generally considered ordinary visits', is 
simply a conclusion without sufficient 
facts to support a similar, but independent, 
judgment by the magistrate'. Jj3. at 1195. 
(emphasis added) 
In light of the case law cited above and the facts 
set forth in the affidavit, it is clear that the affidavit 
fails to establish probable cause to support the warrant. In 
fact McPherson and Higby are dispositive. Both cases involved 
observations of activity which were as consistent with innocent 
activity as with criminal activity. However, there is a critical 
factor present in McPherson and Higby which is lacking in the 
present situation. In each of those cases, the police had 
information that a crime had actually been committed, i.e., 
that marijuana was in fact being sold or grown on the subject 
premises. In the instant case, neither the "neighbor" infor-
mants, nor the surveillance officers observed the commission or 
indication of any crime. Therefore, "more and better evidence 
is needed to prove that probable cause exists". That "better 
evidence" is lacking in the present situation. 
In Anderson, supra, this court sustained an affidavit 
which when: 
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viewed in its entirety and in a common-sense 
fashion, sets forth sufficient underlying 
circumstances to support the reliability 
and credibility of the informant and the 
conclusions of the affiant. (emphasis 
added) 701 P.2d at 1102. 
In the instant case, the affidavit is simply a 
collection of separate and innocuous facts that do not support 
the reliability of the informants. It especially does nothing 
to support the conclusions of the affiant because they are so 
speculative. Thus, under either the old Aguilar-Spinelli test 
or the "totality of the circumstances" test enunciated in 
Gates, probable cause was lacking here. Therefore, the evidence 
should be suppressed pursuant to the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and Article Ir Section 14 of the Utah 
State Constitution. The affidavit is simply a, conglomeration of 
innocuous facts which may arguably establish an articulable 
suspicion but not the probable cause required by the federal 
or state constitutions. 
POINT II 
THE AFFIANT MADE FALSE STATEMENTS IN THE 
AFFIDAVIT KNOWINGLY OR WITH RECKLESS DISRE-
GARD FOR THE TRUTH. WHEN THESE FAJ^ SE 
STATEMENTS ARE REMOVED FROM THE AFFIDAVIT, 
THE REMAINING. FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES FAIL 
TO ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE. 
As the Fourth Amendment and Article If Section 14 
of the Utah Constitution explicitly require, no warrants shall 
issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation. 
This oath or affirmation is typically the affidavit executed by 
the searching officer: 
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While at one time it could be accurately 
said that the prevailing view was that a 
defendant could not dispute the truthfulness 
of matters appearing in a supportive 
affidavit, more and more courts came to 
accept the contrary conclusion. LaFave, 
Search & Seizure; A Treatise on the Fourth 
Amendment, §4.4(a) p.57 (1986 supplement) 
In Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 1674 
(1978), the Supreme Court held that: 
Where the defendant makes a substantial 
preliminary showing that a false statement 
knowingly and intentionally, or with reck-
less disregard for the truth, was included 
by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, 
and if the allegedly false statement is 
necessary to the finding of probable cause, 
the Fourth Amendment requires that a hearing 
be held at the defendant's request. In the 
event that at that hearing the allegeation 
of perjury or reckless disregard is esta-
blished by the defendant by a preponderance 
of the evidence, and, with the affidavit's 
false material set to one side, the affida-
vit's remaining content is insufficient to 
establish probable cause, the search warrant 
must be voided and the fruits of the search 
excluded to the same extent as if probable 
cause was lacking on the fact of the affida-
vit. 
This same logic applies to material ommissions on the part of 
the affiant which would otherwise influence a probable cause 
determination. United States v. Ippolito, 774 F.2d 1482, 1486 
n.l (9th Cir. 1985) 
Since the affidavit contains false and misleading 
information thereby satisfying the requirements of Franks, then 
as a matter of federal law, "the search warrant must be voided 
and the fruits of the search excluded". On page two of the 
affidavit, the following statement is made: 
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A traffic survey of the area identified 
several cars for which ownership records 
identified a known drug user coming and 
going from the premises in the early morning 
hours. These vehicles stay only a short 
time and then leave, j 
Appellant submits that this statement is false and misleading 
in that it implies that several cars were identified as belonging 
to known drug users. This statement was made with the knowledge 
that only one car was owned by a person who had been arrested 
for possession of drug paraphernalia. This fact was not set 
forth in the affidavit. The allegation that the person was a 
"known drug user" is an unsupported conclusion and was made 
with the knowledge that the charge of possession of drug para-
phernalia had been dismissed. (Tr. 11) ! 
On page two of the affidavit, Officer Smith states: 
The suspect Allen B. Miller has prior 
illegal possession charges for possession 
of psilacybin mushrooms, 1/4 pound, and 
possession of marijuana. Franklin David 
Spain of the same address has also been 
arrested for possession of marijuana in the 
last year. 
Appellant was charged with possession of marijuana on May 12, 
1984 in Kane County. He has never been charged with possession 
of mushrooms or 1/4 pound of anything. The affiant gave no 
indication as to the source of his information, but had he 
checked the court records, he would have found that appellant 
was charged with possession of marijuana and that the charge 
was eventually dismissed without an adjudication of guilt. 
Officer Smith then states in the affidavit that: 
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Franklin David Spain of the same address [as 
that of the appellant] has also been arrested 
for possession of marijuana in the last 
year. 
However, in a report containing information gathered 
before the issuance of the search warrant, Officer Smith stated 
that Mr. Spain's address was 1140 Virginia Way, Barstow, 
California. (Defendant's Exhibit 4) (Tr. 8) Officer Smith 
listed appellant's address as that of Mr. Spain based upon an 
arrest report prepared after Mr. Spain was arrested one year 
prior to preparation of the affidavit. (Tr. 9, 10) During his 
six weeks of surveillance, Officer Smith never saw Mr. Spain at 
appellant's home, (Tr. 9) yet he included a statement to that 
effect in the affidavit. 
On page two of the affidavit, in the final paragraph, 
Officer Smith states: 
...and the truck [would be] used to load 
shipments for periodic distribution or 
final cultivation of plants at another 
growing site. 
This statement is not only an unsupported conclusion, but was 
misleading in that Officer Smith neglected to include the fact 
that the police had observed the contents of the U-Haul truck. 
The contents consisted of peatmoss, vermiculite soil conditioner 
and other soil expanders, as set forth in Officer Smith's 
investigation report. (Defendant's Exhibit 4) 
On page two, final paragraph, affiant states: 
...Credit report shows suspect Miller self-
employed with Miller's Auto Body Shop, 
which does not seem to exist. 
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Nowhere in the affidavit does Officer Smith Identify a source 
or basis for this statement. There are two attachments to the 
affidavit, one a copy of appellant's Utah Power & Light Co. 
records, which indicate that appellant is self-employed by 
Miller's Automotive Paints. The second attachment is a hand-
written document by Officer Smith, with no showing of it being 
under oath, containing several statements. fn this attachment 
Officer Smith states: 
Through checking of business license and 
Bell Telephone listings, no record of a 
Miller's Auto Body and Paints h^s been 
found in Salt Lake County. 
This statement is false in that appellant never stated that he 
was employed by "Miller's Auto Body Shop" and it is misleading 
in that it tends to infer that defendant is untruthful and, 
when read in connection with the balance of the affidavit, 
infers that appellant had no source of income and, therefore, must 
have been selling drugs. The statement was made knowingly or 
with a reckless disregard for the truth in view of the informa-
tion Officer Smith had from Utah Power & Light Co. 
The facts stated in the affidavit, standing alone, 
fail to establish probable cause. When the infirm portions 
of the affidavit are removed, the State cannot conceivably 
claim that the remaining provisions establish probable cause. 
Therefore, the warrant is invalid and the evidence seized 
should have been suppressed. 
Even if this court should find that the remaining 
portions of the affidavit establish probable cause under federal 
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law, appellant submits that the misconduct of the affiant 
officer renders the affidavit invalid under Article I, Section 
14 of the Utah Constitution. 
In State v. Nielson, 43 Utah Adv.Rpt. 13 (Utah 1986), 
this court had the opportunity to apply Franks to an affidavit 
wherein the affiant officer intentionally made misstatements of 
fact. The court went on to holdf based upon those particular 
facts, that the misstatements did not materially effect the 
magistrates finding of probable cause. Therefore, the court 
found that, as a matter of federal law, the warrant and subsequent 
search had to be sustained. The defendant in that case did not 
argue that the warrant and search were in violation of the Utah 
Constitution. In this regard the court stated: 
Our upholding of the warrant under federal 
law should not be read as an endorsement 
of [the affiant's] conduct or as a deter-
mination of how the issue might be resolved 
under the Utah Constitution. As this case 
illustrates, the federal law as it has 
developed since Franks v. Deleware is not 
entirely adequate. There is no stronger 
argument for developing adequate remedies 
for violations of the state and federal 
constitutional prohibitions on unreasonable 
searches and seizures than the example of a 
police officer deliberately lying under 
oath in order to obtain a search warrant. 
See S. Kipperman, Inaccurate Search Warrant 
Affidavits as a Ground for Suppressing 
Evidence, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 825, 831 (1971). 
To allow a police officer to obtain a warrant 
utilizing false information tends to under-
mine respect for the legal system and to 
make the public cynical about the honesty 
and professionalism of those entrusted with 
law enforcement. As one commentator has 
observed, however, "[e]ven though warrants 
issued on the basis of police perjury and 
warrants issued without probable cause are 
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equally reprehensible, they are not equally 
unconstitutional..•. Under Franks, evidence 
is to be excluded if, inter alia, the 
culpability of the affiant-officer destroyed 
probable cause," but warrants based on 
perjury may be constitutional if probable 
cause otherwise exists. Comment, Franks v. 
Deleware; Granting the Right to Challenge 
the Veracity of Search Warrant Affidavits, 
45 Brooklyn L. Rev. 391, 405 (Winter 1979). 
Our decision about what the appropriate 
remedy might be if Nielsen had argued that 
the officer's action violated his rights 
under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution is an open question. This 
court has not decided whether an immaterial, 
intentional misstatement in an affidavit 
supporting a warrant requires suppression 
of the evidence as a matter of Utah law or 
whether it may give rise to some civil 
cause of action. It is worth noting, 
however, that the Utah Legislature has 
enacted a statute which provides a remedy 
for search and seizure violations under the 
Utah Constitution. See Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, §78-16-1 to 11 (Repl. Vol. 9A, 1977 
ed., Supp. 1985). In addition, the police 
officer may be liable for damages under the 
provisions of the federal Civil Rights Act, 
42 U.S.C. §1983 (1982). Cf. Malley v. 
Briggs, 475 U.S. , 106 S.Ct. 1092 (March 
5, 1986). Id_. at 15, 16. (emphasis added) 
It is time for this court to fill the gap in the 
federal law created by Franks v. Deleware, supra. If the court 
should find that the affidavit establishes propable cause even 
without the deleted false statements, then as a matter of 
public policy and state law, this affidavit: should be invali-
dated. If the actions of Officer Smith are allowed to support 
a finding of probable cause in this case, then this court would 
render the search warrant "a mere charade, and the basic liberty 
protected by [Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution] 
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would constitute an unenforceable right, or more realistically 
statedf no right at all". State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d at 1104. 
POINT III 
WHEN THIS COURT DETERMINES THAT PROBABLE 
CAUSE WAS NOT IN FACT ESTABLISHED, THE 
EVIDENCE SEIZED IS NOT OTHERWISE ADMISSIBLE 
UNDER THE UTAH CODE OR UNDER THE LEON "GOOD 
FAITH" EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE. 
In United States v. Leon, 104 S.Ct. 2405 (1984) the 
United States Supreme Court concluded that "the Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule should be modified so as not to bar the use 
in the prosecution's case in chief of evidence obtained by 
officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant 
issued by a detached and neutral magistrate, but ultimately 
found to be unsupported by probable cause". United States v. 
Leon, 104 S.Ct. at 3409. However, in reaching its decision the 
court cautioned: 
...Nevertheless, the officer's reliance on 
the magistrate's probable cause determina-
tion and on the technical sufficiency of 
the warrant that issues must be objectively 
reasonable, and it is clear that in some 
circumstances the officer will have no 
reasonable grounds for believing that the 
warrant was properly issued. 
Suppression, therefore, remains an appro-
priate remedy if the magistrate or judge in 
issuing a warrant was misled by information 
in the affidavit that the affiant knew was 
false or would have known was false except 
for his reckless disregard of the truth. 
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978)... 
Nor would an officer manifest objective 
good faith in relying on a warrant based on 
an affidavit so lacking in indicia of 
probable cause as to render affiant's 
belief in its existence unreasonable. Id. 
at 421-22. (emphasis added) 
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The facts set forth in the affidavit and the conduct of 
Officer Smith have been discussed at length I and need not be 
repeated. Those facts clearly establish two points. First, 
the affidavit was so lacking in factual information upon which to 
support a finding of probable cause that Officer Smith's belief 
that probable cause existed was objectively unreasonable. 
Second, the false and misleading information contained in the 
affidavit exhibits a lack of good faith on the part of Officer 
Smith, who was both the affiant and executing officer. There-
fore, the state is not entitled to make use of the "good faith" 
exception to the exclusionary rule. The conduct of Officer 
Smith is not that which the Supreme Court in Leon sought to 
promote. In fact, the proscription of this type of conduct is 
the very basis for the exclusionary rule itself. Therefore, 
the Leon good faith exception is both inapplicable and inappro-
i 
priate in the present situation. 
POINT IV 
THE UTAH FOURTH AMENDMENT ENFORCEMENT ACT IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER BOTH THE CONSTITUTION 
OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE CONSTITUTION OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH. 
The Utah State legislature has attempted to create 
and codify its own good faith exception to the exclusionary 
rule in passing the Fourth Amendment Enforcement Act, Utah Code 
Annotated, §78-16-1, ejt. seq. Section 78-16-5 thereof states: 
No evidence which is otherwise competent 
and admissible shall be excluded from any 
criminal proceeding because of the violation 
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of Fourth Amendment rights except evidence 
whichf though otherwise admissible, was 
secured in a method which involved a 
substantial violation of Fourth Amendment 
rights as provided in subsection 77-35-
12(g). J[d_. (emphasis added) 
Utah Code Annotated, §77-23-12 defines "substantial" 
in the following manner: 
Pursuant to the standards described in ^ 77-
35-12(g) property or evidence seized pur-
suant to a search warrant shall not be 
suppressed at a motion, trial or other 
proceeding unless the unlawful conduct of 
the peace officer is shown to be substantial. 
Any unlawful search or seizure shall be 
considered substantial and in bad faith if 
the warrant was obtained with malicious 
purpose and without probable cause or was 
executed maliciously and willfully beyond 
the authority of the warrant or with un-
necessary severity. Id_. (emphasis added) 
Utah Code Annotated, §77-35-12(g) states: 
(1) In any motion concerning the admissi-
bility of evidence or the suppression of 
evidence pursuant to this section or at 
trial, upon grounds of unlawful search and 
seizure, the suppression of evidence shall 
not be granted unless the court finds the 
violation upon which it is based to be both 
a substantial violation and not committed 
in good faith. The court shall set forth 
its reasoning for such finding. 
(2) An unlawful search or seizure shall in 
all cases be deemed substantial if one or 
more of the following is established by the 
defendant or applicant by a preponderance 
of the evidence: 
(i) The violation was grossly negligent, 
willful, malicious, shocking to the cons-
cious of the court or was a result of the 
practice of law enforcement agency pursuant 
to a general order of that agency; 
(ii) The violation was intended only to 
harass without legitimate law enforcement 
purposes. Id. 
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From these statutory provisions, it is clear that a 
defendant roust prove that the constitutional violation was both 
"substantial", i.e., grossly negligent, willful, malicious, or 
shocking to the conscience of the court, and not committed in 
good faith. As defined in Utah Code Annotated, §76-2-103: 
A person engages in conduct: 
(1) . . .willfully with respect to the nature 
of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, 
when it is his conscious objective or desire 
to engage in the conduct or cause the re-
sult. 
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect 
to circumstances surrounding his conduct or 
the result of his conduct when he is aware 
of but consciously disregards a substantial 
and unjustifiable risk that the circum-
stances exist or the result will occur. 
The risk must be of such a nature and 
degree that its disregard constitutes a 
gross deviation from the standard of care 
that an ordinary person would exercise 
under all the circumstances as viewed from 
the actor's standpoint. Id. 
These are the burdensome elements which a defendant must prove 
in order to suppress evidence obtained in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment. It is important to note that this Utah Act 
explicitly applies only to the federal constitution, i.e., the 
Fourth Amendment, and not to the Utah constitution. 
The United States Supreme Court has held that the 
Fourth Amendment only requires that a defendant prove that "the 
officers were dishonest or reckless in preparing their affidavit 
or could not have harbored an objectively reasonable belief in 
the existence of probable cause" in order to avoid admission 
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under the good faith exception. United States v. Leon, 104 
S.Ct. at 3410. Since the Fourth Amendment Enforcement Act was 
passed before Leon, there is bound to be some incongruence 
between the Utah State Legislature's and the United States 
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment and the 
exclusionary rule. However, as set forth above, the incongruence 
is not slight because §77-35-12 defines good faith in a way which 
does not comport at all, to Leon's good faith definition. For 
this reason, the statute violates the Fourth Amendment. In 
fact, the added burden place upon a defendant under the Utah 
act goes far beyond that which is required by the federal con-
stitution, as interpreted by Leon, and renders this statutory 
framework unconstitutional under both the federal and state 
constitutions. 
If this court should find that the Utah act is in fact 
constitutional, then appellant submits that the facts and cir-
cumstances of this case establish a violation of the §77-35-12, 
et seq. Officer Smith's misstatements in the affidavit were 
the product of gross negligence and/or made willfully or mali-
ciously to misinform the court. 
POINT V 
THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE DO 
NOT JUSTIFY THE ISSUANCE OF A "NO-KNOCK" 
WARRANT. 
On page three of the affidavit, the affiant requests 
that the officer executing the warrant not be required to give 
notice of his authority or purpose because: (1) physical harm may 
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result to any person if notice were given; and (2) the property 
sought may be quickly destroyed, disposed of, or secreted, 
(Defendant's Exhibit 1) The affiant then states that he believes 
"this danger existed", because: 
Two large watch dogs are always present and 
might pose a hazard to the arresting 
officers. 
Based on the statement, the search warrant contained the follow-
ing direction from the magistrate: 
You are therefore commanded: 
To execute without notice of authority 
or purpose, (proof under oath being shown 
that the object of this search may be 
quickly destroyed or disposed of or that 
harm may result to any person if notice 
were given ) . | 
Utah Code Annotated, §77-23-10(2) provides that such 
a direction to the officer may only be inserted in a warrant: 
..•upon proof, under oath, that the object 
of the search may be quickly destroyed, 
disposed of, or secreted, or that physical 
harm may result to any person if notice 
were given. 
There is no evidence, other than the affiant1s 
statement, unsupported by the body of the affidavit, that the 
police observed any dogs at the residence during the six week 
surveillance. Further,*there is no evidence or inference that 
any dog on the premises had any propensity to be dangerous, or 
how the affiant determined that the dogs were "watchdogs". 
Evidence produced at the suppression hearing showed 
that there were no dogs present on the premises for several 
weeks before the warrant was executed, and therefore, the state-
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ment of the affiant was false. Additionally, it would seem 
that physical harm would be more likely to occur with an un-
announced, armed entry into the house, with dogs present. 
In State of Washington v. Jeter, 634 P.2d 312 (1981), 
the court addressed the issue of what circumstances were 
necessary to sustain a "no knock" warrant, under a statute 
similar to Utah's: 
. . .In order to justify the search of premises 
without police first announcing their 
presence, the State must demonstrate the 
existence of exigent circumstances. Exigent 
circumstances include a genuine concern for 
police safety and a belief that contraband 
will be destroyed, as was asserted in the 
present case. However, such exigent 
circumstances must be based upon specific 
facts learned prior to execution of the 
warrant or observed at the scene, in contrast 
to a generalized speculation by law 
enforcement officers that their safety may 
be endangered or contraband destroyed. 
In the present case the trial courts1 
finding of exigent circumstances was based 
upon a belief tha defendant could destroy 
the contraband and a concern for police 
safety based on ... information that 
defendant kept a weapon. Neither provides 
a sufficient factual basis to rise to the 
level of exigent circumstances. A belief 
that contraband will be destroyed must be 
based upon sounds or activities observed at 
the scene or prior specific knowledge that 
a particular suspect has a propensity to 
destroy contraband. 
Likewise, a concern for police safety must 
be based upon prior knowledge or direct 
observation that the subject of the search 
keeps weapons and that such a person has a 
known propensity to use them. (citation 
ommitted) at 314. 
There was no basis for a "no notice" provision to be 
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inserted in the warrant. Therefore, the warrant was issued and 
executed in violation of the statute and the constitutional 
right to be free from unreasonable searches and the evidence 
seized should have been suppressed. 
POINT VI 
THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE, BEYOND A REASON-
ABLE DOUBT, THAT THE MATERIAL SEIZED FROM 
APPELLANTfS RESIDENCE WAS IN FACT MARI-
JUANA. 
As already stated herein, the State produced three 
witnesses at trial in order to establish that the plant material 
was marijuana. Officer Smith testified that he observed and 
smelled what he believed to be marijuana. (R. 219) Kevin 
Smith testified that he examined the substance microscopically 
and performed the Duquenois-Levine chemical test. (R. 228) 
Based upon these tests, Kevin Smith concluded that the plants 
were marijuana. Finally, the state called Robert Brinkman to 
testify as to the pertinent industry standards. This was the 
only evidence presented by the State. 
Although the case law on the subject is scant, there 
is one case which is dispositive of the present issue. In 
State v. Vail, 274 N.W.2d 127 (Minn. 1979), the court held 
that a microscopic examination, the Duquenois-Levine test, and 
a thin layer chromatography test were insufficient to establish 
the fact that the substance before that court was marijuana. 
In reaching its decision, the court heard the testimony of the 
arresting officers, a state criminalist and the expert testimony 
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of Dr. Marc G. Kurzman, who was the attorney representing 
appellant at trial. 
In the present situation, it is important to note 
that Kevin Smith performed only two of the three tests used in 
Vail. In fact, appellant, through the cross examination of 
the state's witnesses and direct examination of Dr. Dwight 
Fullerton, a professor at Oregon State University College of 
Pharmacy and who specializes in plant identification, (R. 254, 
255) established the fact that the two tests employed by Kevin 
Smith are not scientifically effective in identifying mari-
juana. 
Kevin Smith, who has never had any botanical training 
(R. 235), testified that his microscopic examination showed 
that the plant material contained cystolith and long, single 
cell hairs. (R. 234) However, these same hairs are found on 
hundreds of different plants. (R. 235, 261) With regard to 
the Duquenors-Levine test, Kevin Smith admitted that other 
chemical substances could react similarly to marijuana. (R. 
239) However, Kevin Smith only visually checked to see if any 
such reactants were located on the plant material. 
One of the most effective ways of identifying marijuana 
is through the use of mass spectroscopy. (R. 270) This is an 
infrared procedure which specifically identifies those chemicals 
which are unique to marijuana. (R. 271, 272) Kevin Smith 
testified that he had this procedure available to him, that the 
spectrometry method is used in identifying most controlled 
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substances, but in the present situation, he did not use the 
equipment to form his conclusion. (R. 232, 233) 
Therefore, because Kevin Smith failed to follow proper 
procedures to insure that reactants were not present on the 
plant, which could have caused it to react positively to the 
Duquenois-Levine test, and because he failed to use the spec-
trometry equipment which would have proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt whether the material was marijuana, the state failed to 
meet its burden of proof. Dispositive is Dr. Fullerton's 
statement that, had he been present with thej evidence produced 
by the State, he would not be able to conclude that the plant 
material was marijuana with any reasonable degree of scientific 
certainty. (R. 268, 269) 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, appellant submits 
that the evidence seized as a result of the search of his 
residence should be ordered suppressed. In the alternative, 
appellant requests this court to order this case dismissed 
because the State failed to prove the existejnce of a controlled 
substance beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Dated this day of January, 1987. 
RONALD J. YENGICH 
EARL XAIZ 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of 
the foregoing were mailed/delivered to the Attorney Generalfs 
Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114, 
on this day of January, 1987. 
38 
ADDENDUM 
§77-35-12(g), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended: 
(g)(1) In any motion concerning the admissibility of the 
evidence or the suppression of evidence pursuant to this section 
or at trial, upon grounds of unlawful search and seizure, the 
suppression of evidence shall not be granted unless the court 
finds the violation upon which it is based to be both a 
substantial violation and not committed in good faith. The 
court shall set forth its reasons for such finding. 
(2) An unlawful serach or seizure shall in all cases 
be deemed substantial if one or more of the following is 
established by the defendant or applicant by a preponderance of 
the evidence: 
(i) The violation was grossly negligent, willful, 
malicious, shocking to the conscience of the court or was a 
result of the practice of the law enforcement agency pursuant 
to a general order of that agency; 
(ii) The violation was intended only to harass 
without legitimate law enforcement purposes. 
(3) In determining whether a peace officer was acting 
in good faith under this section, the court shall consider, in 
addition to any other relevant factors, some or all of the 
following: 
(i) The extent of deviation from legal search and 
seizure standards; 
(ii) The extent to which exclusion will tend to 
deter future violations of search and seizure standards; 
(iii) Whether or not the officer was proceeding 
by way of a search warrant, arrest warrant, or relying on 
previous specific directions of a magistrate or prosecutor; 
or 
(iv) The extent to which privacy was invaded. 
(4) If the defendant or applicant establishes that the 
search or seizure was unlawful and substantial by a preponderance 
of the evidence, the peace officer or governmental agency must 
then, by a preponderance of the evidence, prove the good faith 
actions of the peace officer. 
L. "TED" CANNON 
inty Attorney 
' MICHAEL J. CHRISTENSEN 
yjty County Attorney 
irtside Office Building 
I East 400 South, 3rd Floor 
It Lake City, Utah 84111 
one: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
"ATE OF UTAH ) 
) : SS 
>unty of Salt Lake ) 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH' WARRANT 
SFORE: 450 South 200 East 
JUDGE ADDRESS 
he undersigned affiant being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
hat he has reason to believe 
hat (X) on the premises known as 7889 South 3850 West, West Jordan, Utah 
n the City of West Jordan, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, there is now 
ertain property or evidence described as: 
larijuana plants and/or mushrooms in various stages of cultivation, grow lights, 
cultivating paraphernalia, packaging materials, ledgers, drying equipment, seeds, 
x>tting soil and containers and bank receipts 
ind zhat said property or evidence: 
(X) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed; 
(X) has been used to commit or conceal a public offense; 
(X) is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means of 
committing or concealing a public offense; 
(X) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal conduct, 
possessed by a party to the illegal conduct; 
Affiant believes the property and evidence described above is evidence of the 
crime(s) of Cultivation and Possession of Controlled Substance. 
PAGE TWO CAU^LJL • 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT Q ^ > U ^ U , A^ilS^ 
The facts to establish the grounds for issuance of a Search Warrant are: ^
 t • 
On June 14, 1985, upon receipt of complaints of unusual traffic in the 
neighborhood of suspect premises by neighbors, affiant and other members 
of the State of Utah Narcotics and Liquor Law Enforcement began investi-
gation and surveillance of said suspect premises. In plain view observation 
of premises affiant observed and photographed the residence showing three 
large steel storage sheds to rear; two swamp coolers that blow continually 
and empty into boarded up and bermed basement area; a furnace like 
apparatus with two large vent stacks are seen in garage area where windows 
are also boarded up, but are visible from roof line and when side door 
is open; a series of lights commonly used for grow lights were observed 
and photographed on swamp cooler; and neighbors have observed occupants 
of residence mixing up peat moss although the yard has never been cared 
for or cultivated in any fashion. A traffic survey of the area identified 
several cars for which ownership records identified a known drug user 
coming and going from the premises in the early morning hours. These 
vehicles stay only a short time then leave. 
On numerous occasions a U-Haul truck has been located to the rear of 
the garage and neighbors have heard loading and unloading from the side 
door which is not as readily observable as the front garage door. This 
loading seems to occur at odd hours late at night. Neighbors have never 
seen the large garage door open. Neighbors reported seeing two large 
dogs with occupants when they were mixing peat moss, but most of the 
time the dogs remain inside. 
Contact with Utah Power and Light showed service lines coming into the 
home three times larger than required of that size residence. Monthly 
power consumption four to five times in excess of normal, with one bill 
for $2,Y00.00J/which suspect paid when meter reader came to read the meter. 
Utah Power and Light has been denied access to meter by Miller and has 
paid any bill without contest. The suspect, Allen B. Miller has prior 
illegal possession charges for possession of psilacybin mushrooms, 1/4 
pound and possession of marijuana. Franklin David Spain of the same 
address has also been arrested for possession of marijuana in the last 
year. Miller according to neighbors acts very secretive when observed 
around premises. 
Affiant, a trained narcotics officer knows that peat moss is used for 
growing marijuana and mushrooms and has observed numerous stacks of 
plastic buckets at the residence, knows that furnaces can be used to 
dry plants for useage, and that swamp coolers can vent and humify plants 
being grown in a basement as at suspect premises. Large electrical 
consumption would be used to facilitate grow lights and drying equipment; 
and the truck used to load shipments for periodic distribution or final 
cultivation of plants at another growing site. Credit report shows 
suspect Miller self-employed with Miller's autobody shop which does not 
seem to exist. Suspect truck observed at residence never has tools 
in i t . Surveillance termination 1200 hours, August 1, 1985. 
PAGE THREE 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
Your affiant considers the information received from the confidential 
informant reliable because (if any information is obtained from an unnamed 
source.1) . Neighbors are private citizens whose reports have been observed 
and verified by affiant and photographed. Photographs are presented to 
magistrate as part of probable cause statement. 
Your affiant has verified the above information from the confidential 
informant to be correct and accurate through the following idenpendent 
investigation: continuous surveillance from June 14, 1985 to August 1, 
1985 in which traffic survey and photographic surveillance, and background 
investigations confirmed neighbor9s reports. 
WHEREFORE: the affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued for the seizure 
of said items: 
(X) at any time day or night because there is reason to believe 
i t is necessary to seize the property prior to it being 
concealed, destroyed, damaged, or altered, or for other • 
good reasons, to-wit: 
It is further requested that (if appropriate) the officer executing the 
requested warrant not be required to give notice of the officer's authDrity 
or purpose because: 
(X) physical harm may result to any person if notice were given; 
or 
(x) the property sought may be quickly destroyed, disposed of, or 
secreted. 
This danger is believed to exist because: 
Two large watch dogs are always present and might pose a hazard to 
arresting officers. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME thi 
JUDGE IN l^EJ^FTH CTRCUIT^OURT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
XLv&ujk, cUeckj\^ ffutttHW /re.. c*nd &?// 7^/^P^Ci>^^ /'Jpi*f 
Jbu^d. ft, ya/f /«Je ^udr^ • 
{077. o5 ^/-ive^f, «-s £+ui0fiU*±6l-. liar X&ffe^ UfrS «*^t^ S^ a^ K. Ce»*Kj*<iK/i 
kttr W-£T 
I'^LV KtHf 
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L. "TFD" CANNON 
mty Attorney 
: MICHAEL J. CHRISTEN SEN 
outy County Attorney 
jrtside Office Building 
I Last 4 00 South, 3rd Flo-.^r 
It Lake City, Vtah F41H 
one - (SC ." 'vf .v-"•-
In '2 ill i" i1 i" '.' ]tu T 7 i ] l l i k l ' ' -' ' .* I M r r»f7 AFT^FN 
IN AND FOR SAL1 LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SEARCH WARRANT 
VN7 '* C J S z i LI LAKE, SI A3 T • 01 I '2 A H 
any peace officer in the State ci r Utah. 
'oof by Affidavit under oath having bet-:. ::.ade this day before me by Officer 
dth - NLLEB, I am satisfied that there is probable cause to believe 
\at >. ^ jjtr .,.tjijst^  Known as 7889 South 3850 West , fcest Jordan, itah, 
to include residence structure and any and all other structures as>: 
vehicles en said property
 / Vre nK£, S K f ^ ;iJ^J m%- *+~ '* """ V f '{ 
i the City of West Jordan, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, there is now 
trtain property or evidence described as; 
ii ijuana plants and/or mushrooms in various stages of cultivation, grow lightsf 
iltivating paraphernalia, packaging materials, ledgers, bank, receipts, drying 
juipment, seeds, po11ing soil and containers 
id that said proper*- \- - * vidence: 
.(X* ^«> ^niau:uily acquired or is unlaw! ully possessed ; 
iX n^s been used to commit or conceal a public off ense; 
is being possessed with the purport of use i t as a means of committing 
or concealing a public offense; 
I ; :) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal conduct, 
possessed by a party to the illegal conduct; 
DU are theref ore commanded: 
I X ) at any time day oi night (good cause having been shoun) 
(X) to execute without notice of authority or purpose, (proof undei 
oath being shown that the objec t of this search may be quickly 
destroyed or disposed of oi that harm may result to any person if 
notice were civen) 
PAGE TWO 
SEARCH WARRANT 
to make a search of the alcove-named or described premises for the herein-
above described property or evidence and if you find the same or any part 
thereof, to bring it forthwith before me at the Fifth Circuit Court, County 
of Salt Lake, State of Utah, or retain such property in your custody, subject 
to the order of this court. 
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND and dated this 
